Abstract
Introduction
Hans Kelsen was bom on 11 October 1881 In Prague, in the Austrian imperial part of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. From 1883 on the family lived In Vienna. After completing his law degree, Kelsen undertook his habilltatlon In 1911 . From 1919 to 1930 he held the position of 'ordentlicher Professor fur Stoats-und Verwaltungsrecht' (full professor of state and administrative law) at the University of Vienna. In 1930, Kelsen accepted a call to Cologne and left Austria permanently. 1 Kelsen's Vienna years fell in the heyday of Viennese modernism, which had begun with the famous/in de slecle. The modernist period continued for the first three decades of this century and it was only with the Stdndestaat that it came to an abrupt end. In recent years numerous publications have appeared which address the social and historical conditions of this intellectually progressive period, the diverse ties among its circle did have Jewish family backgrounds, 7 many other outstanding minds of the time did not. Alfred Verdross and Adolf Julius Merkl, Hans Kelsen's earliest companions, came from bourgeois families and this was very common among civil servants. 8 Of course, Kelsen's Jewish background figured prominently in his socialization and career. Although Kelsen's father was a mill-owner, the family was by no means wealthy. Nevertheless, they were able to provide a first-class education by Viennese standards for their eldest son, who had a good mind but was not brilliant, at Vienna's Akademisches Gymnasium. The gymnasium schools of the imperial and royal monarchy mainly functioned as a sort of 'transmission belt', providing children from relatively modest backgrounds, who were not necessarily recognized as being 'brainchildren', with a good education at an early age. There are many accounts of how the BiMung-conscious Jewish bourgeoisie, to which the Kelsen family belonged, took advantage of this opportunity to help their children move up the social ladder. 9 If one were to gauge the standard of Vienna's gymnasium schools at the turn of the century on the basis of the performance of their graduates, one could be excused for thinking that they were a remarkable academic achievement. Graduates of Kelsen's generation included the famous political economist Ludwig von Mises (the same class as Kelsen), the nuclear physicist Lise Meitner in 1901, the Nobel Prize laureate Erwin Schrodinger in 1906, to name but a few. As in all Viennese gymnasium schools, the percentage of 'mosaic' students -the official term for 'Jewish' students -was high and in 1900 it was almost 50 per cent. 10 Indeed, the influential role of gymnasium education in this period should not be underestimated. Nevertheless, in spite of a relatively progressive education policy, 11 the school also had a reacfionary and 'ugly' face.
12 It certainly does not appear, however, that Kelsen's schooling stunted the development of his remarkable talents.
Me'tall reports that Kelsen's decision to study law was primarily based on practical considerations. He was initially drawn more to literature and philosophy. Kelsen's friendship with Otto Weininger also seems to have been important for his Intellectual development At first Kelsen showed little enthusiasm for legal theory; however. 
Ct. Friedrich Torberg's famous novel Der Schtiler Gerber hat absolvlrrt (1930). Metall has no doubt that
Keben was not at all happy In gymnasium where his 'self-awareness constantly starving for gratification' wai equally constantly hurt during the course of his studies -and with the development of the methodological aspects of his work -his interest in the subject seems to have grown more intense. 1 J 3 Development of the Pure Theory of Law Hans Kelsen has been aptly described as the 'legal expert of the century'.
14 He was particularly concerned with the development and gradual consolidation of a theory of 'critical legal positivism', a Pure Theory of Law. Notwithstanding the importance Kelsen gave to social philosophical works, 15 his approach was based on issues of legal theory. Before moving on to an analysis of Kelsen's thought, a brief sketch of the basic ideas of the Pure Theory of Law is in order. a. The basic issue of the Pure Theory of Law is the description of law as a specific social method involving the control of human behaviour by means of coercion. b. The Pure Theory is a theory about norms: it sees its subject -positive law -as an ought-system (Sollensordnung). The legal system is described as a structure of legal norms rather than of social facts. Only this normative interpretation is adequate in respect to the immanent meaning of law, its claim to validity. The Pure Theory of Law thus stands in opposition to certain theories of sociological jurisprudence, which deny the possibility of normative (legal doctrinal) jurisprudence. c. The Pure Theory of Law is a positivist theory: legal norms are defined as the meaning of human acts of will. It discards all natural law doctrines, whether they see law as a product of supernatural will or as constructions of reason. Accordingly, the task of legal doctrine is essentially to ascertain as precisely as possible the will of the law-maker. d. The Pure Theory of Law is based on the separation of Is and Ought (Sein und Sollen): its foundation is the epistemological dualism of facts and values, statements and norms, cognition and volition. In this way, it rejects all legal theories that derive the validity of law from its effectiveness. The ultimate justification for the objective validity of law is grounded in an assumption that Kelsen terms the Gnmdnorm (basic norm). This does not lie at the basis of just any normative ('ought') order, but -in accordance with legal positivism -of one All in all, the Pure Theory of Law thus has a dual function: on the one hand, it is an epistemology, a 'methodology' upon which jurists can base legal science (in the sense of Rechtsdogmatik, a specifically German concept); on the other hand, however, it also represents a critical dispute with conventional jurisprudence, which Kelsen accused of distorting positive law 'ideologically' under the guise of seemingly juridical constructions (Ideologiekritik). One could say that the Pure Theory of Law is a legal theory with both legal and sociological ramifications.
Kelsen began his juridical career during the period of constitutional law positivism, an approach advocated by the leading German and Austrian constitutional law scholars at the turn of the century. It in turn was strongly influenced by the 'juridical-dogmatic method' in the theory of public law. 17 Of course, this older brand of positivism showed serious shortcomings: it sought to concentrate constitutional law, as the 'theory of constitutional law', on positive law, while in many respects still adhering to the earlier methodological diversity. An autonomous juridical discipline, as had already been established for civil law, for instance, was still a long way off. At the same time (and certainly in keeping with my first claim), the older brand of positivism was not aware of its own epistemological underpinnings. positivism, it was in a sense a naive 'natural law' positivism that proceeded from the assumption that the orders of authority simply had to be followed.
In preparing his Habilitationsschrift, Hauptprobleme der Staatsrechtslehre ('Main Issues of the Theory of Constitutional Law'), subsequently published in 1911,Kelsen came into contact with the major German scholars.
18 He was particularly influenced by Edmund Bematdk, the leading Austrian professor of constitutional law. In legal theory terms, Bernatzik's text Rechtsprechung und matericttc Rechtskraft (1886) 19 was profound, even though his attention subsequently remained focused on individual dogmatic issues of the -certainly quite complex -positive Austrian constitutional law. It was not only through his writings that Bernatzik exerted a 'moderate' influence on the young scholar, he was also Kelsen's Habilitation advisor in 1911 (his first advisor was Adolf Menzel, professor of administrative law and administrative policy). 20 It has often been remarked that the difficult circumstances for constitutional law deriving from the dual monarchy contributed significantly to the development of the Pure Theory of Law. This assessment is certainly not incorrect In an autobiographical sketch, 21 Kelsen stated the following in reference to the 'Austrian aspect' of the Pure Theory of Law:
Considering the Austrian state which was made up of so many different racial, linguistic, religious and historical groups, theories that tried to found the unity of the state on some soclo-psychologlcal or soclo-biologlcal context of the persons legally belonging to a state clearly proved to be fictions. To the extent that this theory of state is an important part of the Pure Theory of Law, the Pure Theory of Law can be seen as a specifically Austrian theory.
Here, however, the Austrian reference to the Pure Theory of Law is also relativized. Merkl, in particular, developed highly Important theoretical legal insights from his analysis of issues of constitutional dogma, 22 but one would be misguided in viewing the Pure Theory as merely being a specifically Austrian conceptualization.
The main problems, however, became evident in Kelsen's first attempt to put legal positivism on a new methodological foundation. As opposed to the fully developed theory -the principal points of which were sketched out above -the legal dynamic between basic norm and the theory of stages (of development) as well as the distinction between (prescriptive) legal norm and (descriptive) legal doctrine were still lacking. The aspect of volition played a completely different role than In Kelsen's later work. Key elements of his early work are the rigid distinction between 'being' and " For instance. Jdllnek and Anschutx. However, these personal acquaintances did not play an Important role In Kelsen's development " On Bematilk. see Walter, supra note 17, at 616: G. Wlnkler. GeleItwort zu Bematzll Uber den Begriffder juristischen Person (reprinted 1996) . at V. 20 On the more subtle connections, see Metall. supra note 1. at 14. " Ibid, at 42. 'ought' with the specifically normative link, i.e., imputation, and the introduction of the 'legal doctrine' as the constitutive central concept of Juridical knowledge.
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Kelsen's method can be seen to be influenced by Kant's transcendental philosophy in the broadest sense. Parallels to contemporary neo-Kantian approaches can be found -in particular, Cohen -but they only become evident in the later development of the Pure Theory of Law, most notably with the introduction of the basic norm. 24 Kelsen's originality lies in the fact that he had recourse to theoretical models already developed in philosophy, which he used in order to found his legal science. Indeed, Kelsen, with his strong cognitive interest in founding a legal science, borrowed those elements from philosophy and legal science which appeared useful to him.
In subsequent years Kelsen continued to elaborate this theory in his prolific writings. The following points are worthy of note in this ongoing development: Kelsen's methodological consolidation of the Pure Theory of Law by incorporating an explanation of the meta-theoretical aspect of theory as a constitutive element 25 his expansion of the theory primarily by focusing on issues of international law; and his growing interest in socio-philosophical issues. 26 The success of the Pure Theory of Law was ultimately also founded on the 'elegant' solution (I.e., purely legal and consistent) of a number of problems of constitutional law that had until that moment remained unsolved, among which were the construction of the federal state, the relation between international law and domestic law, and the essence of state liability.
Kelsen also earned an important place for himself in the history of his country as co-drafter of the Austrian Constitution of 1920. The Constitution, to which Kelsen contributed in a significant manner, is also important from a cultural point of view. A functional legal approach and forthright wording reflected the spirit of modernism. For the period 1920-1929 Kelsen was a member of the Constitutional Court Kelsen developed the theoretical underpinnings of constitutional jurisdiction as a constitutional option and defended it against the critique of German constitutional law in particular.
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As an expert on constitutional law, Kelsen formulated the sixth main part of the Constitution, which covers the organization and procedures of the Constitutional Court. Austria thus introduced a specialized and functional constitutional jurisdiction for the first time in legal history. Kelsen experienced a number of conflicts during his Austrian years with his colleagues at the University of Vienna. At the same time, though, he very soon succeeded in creating a circle of like-minded scholars. Seen from the perspective of a sociology of science, Viennese modernism developed via 'circles', characterized by both academic and private dynamics. Hans Kelsen lived with his family near the University and held regular weekly meetings with his circle. Indeed, it might be more apt to speak of the more prominent members of the circle, Adolf Julius Merkl and Alfred Verdross, as 'companions' rather than 'students'. In particular, Merkl's contribution to the development of the Pure Theory of Law was substantial -which Kelsen always acknowledged. Merkl is responsible for formulating the actual 'theory of hierarchy', and his Allgemeines Verwaltungsrecht (General Administrative Law) provides a clear illustration of the outstanding qualities of the Pure Theory as a methodological Instrument In the hands of a talented legal scientist Among Kelsen's many companions and students -Indeed, too many to name here -Fritz Schreier should be mentioned. During his Viennese years, Kelsen also developed relationships with a number of scholars from abroad. One of the earliest was Leonidas Pitamic who contributed to the development of the theory of basic norms. Later Alf Ross, Charles Elsenmann and Luis Legaz y Lacambra became members of the Kelsen circle." All existing documentation Indicates that the Vienna School of Legal Theory was largely free of serious problems of group dynamics which burdened comparable circles. 32 One exception was of course Kelsen's complex relationship with Fritz Sander, which can only be explained, as we shall see below, in psychoanalytical terms. which made up Kelsen's life in Vienna. In one account of the 'Vienna Circle', primarily oriented towards social, rather than intellectual, groupings from the late 1920s 33 the Kelsen Circle is described as overlapping with the neo-positivist 'Vienna Circle', the circle of neo-liberal political economists (Schumpeter, Hayek and Haberler), Rosa Mayreder's 'Women's League for Peace' and the 'Pan European Movement of Count Coudenhove-Kalergl. The author, Edward Hmms, who developed a 'theory of the Vienna Circle ', 34 found that Interactions among creative circles in Vienna, compared to similar phenomena In other large cities, was particularly dynamic. The most striking feature of the Vienna circles was precisely their points of contact Almost all of these circles overlapped with other neighbouring circles which. In their various cultural formations -among which literature, music, architecture, satire, psychoanalysis, Zionism -pursued similarly radical goals.
Of Kelsen's various connections, there are three which merit particular attention: Kelsen's relations with the Austrian Social Democratic party, to which he contributed notably on an intellectual level although he was not a member; the links between the Pure Theory of Law and the Logical Empiricism of the Vienna Circle; and his contact with psychoanalysis and its founder Sigmund Freud.
A Kelsen and Austrian Social Democracy
Kelsen considered it incompatible with his scientific ethos to become a member of a political party. Accordingly, it can be assumed that he did not have more than a certain sympathy for social democracy.
The This also applies in a paradigmatic way to the distinction between laws of the individual and property laws. The traditional definition of property as one person's exclusive domination of an object was seen as obscuring the socioeconomically decisive function of property, namely the exclusion of control by all others over the given object. 43 Here a strong correspondence with Renner's legal sociological studies may be seen.
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What is more important is the convergence between Kelsen and Renner on the neutrality of state. In contrast to the Marxist dogma of the role of the state as an instrument of class rule and the consequent prediction of a 'demise of the state' in the wake of the proletarian revolution, Renner underlined the neutral function of the H. Malmann (ed.), Die ersten 100 Jahrt. dsterreichlsche SozMdemokraUe 1888 SozMdemokraUe -1988 SozMdemokraUe (1988 .
at 139. The manifesto doses with the following paragraph; The essence of the spirit Is freedom above alL freedom which Is now endangered and which we feel obliged to protect The struggle for a higher humanity and the battle against Inertia and desolation will always find us ready. It also finds us ready here and now.' On the 'background' to social democracy, see 47 Kelsen then went on to study Max Adler's theory, according to which socialism was to be based on a new -neo-Kantian -foundation.
48

B Pure Theory of Law and the Vienna Circle
The Vienna Circle, which thrived in the interwar years, actively sought to found philosophy on the basis of Logical Empiricism. Its influence was far-reaching and represents -with its numerous ramifications -an exceptional Austrian contribution to intellectual life in the twentieth century. Kelsen, Sozlahsmus und Staal (3rd ed.. 1965 It should first be noted that there was an unbridgeable rift between neopositivism and the Pure Theory of Law: Kelsen founded legal science as a 'normaUvist' science that deals with 'objectively' valid law. Here (objective) 'validity' is understood as the specific existence of legal norms. According to the Pure Theory there can be no doubt that legal norms -which belong to the realm of 'ought' -are not to be found in reality by empirical means. However, a mental operation, the assumption of the 'basic norm', makes it possible to describe legal norms as special kinds of 'realities'. In connection with law, 'positivism' implies a limitation to a regularly effective system of orders created by humans.
By contrast, neopositivism focuses on the development of a 'unified science' modelled after logical empiricism. In this context, statements on social facts are also permissible, but these are of the nature of predictions that can be verified by observation. According to Neurath, it is important 'that all statements contain definitions with regard to the spatio-temporal order, the order familiar to us from physics'. A sociology that is expressed in such a way becomes, in physicalist language, 'social behaviorism' where one no longer speaks about 'norms per se' but only 'about people, things and their correlations'.
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One finds numerous references to Kelsen in Neurath's writings. While he always stressed that the Pure Theory of Law followed an anti-'metaphysics' tendency in its studies (cf. later in the text), he rejected Kelsen's idealism, as may be seen in his statement:
When certain legal theoretical problems are no longer dealt with as problems of 'divine law' or of 'natural law' but as problems related to the consistency of certain statements, we are on our way to logical empiricism. But why should we begin such a discussion with speculations on the category of 'being' and 'ought'?"
The neopositivist argument against Kelsen's basic assumption of an 'ought' category illustrates why a concerted effort was made in the further development of critical legal positivism to clearly distinguish between the 'knowledge economical' function of the basic norm and its 'knowledge theoretical' function. 55 To the extent that the selection of the subject is at issue -i.e., the first function -the criterion of expediency is the only standard. Thus, a legal science that can refer to the expediency of a description of a given 'real' system of orders as an 'ought system' -an expediency that has been practised for centuries and whose necessity remains indisputablebecomes 'immunized' against the neo-positivist argument 54 The neopositivist positions on the Pure Theory, however, are ambivalent It needs to be stressed that Kelsen's Ideas were not free of metaphysics, although he followed a tendency that could fit in with the Iogico-empiricist theory. It has been said about Kelsen that he had 'contacts with logical empiricism' 'without accepting it '. 55 Here, Kelsen's relatively little known, yet important book, Vergeltung und Kausalitdt, deserves mention. 56 Basing his arguments on a wealth of ethnological material, Kelsen illustrated the following: i) people interpret 'nature' normatively according to the principle of imputation (thus as society) or scientifically according to the principle of causality (thus as nature); ii) in the development of human thinking the normative method appears before the causal one; iii) the idea of 'causality' only gradually becomes liberated from that of 'retribution'; iv) in the course of emancipation of the idea of causality from that of 'retribution' -through renunciation of absolute necessity -dualism could be overcome in favour of a unified science -also possible within the social field.
Particularly with the last claim, Kelsen moves a certain degree closer to the neopositivist idea: from Kelsen's perspective in these years, the assumption of a category of 'ought' appears to belong to a period of human thinking which should at some stage be overcome. Of course, with this nothing has been said of the expediency of their assumption hie et nunc (cf. above).
The interest of the neoposttivists in Kelsen's thought may also be explained by the fact that Neurath proceeded from a largely historico-sociological approach in developing his new 'scientific world view' -very much like Kelsen. He critically reconstructed the development of human thought right up to his own scientific standpoint. In so doing, he built up a sort of 'social history of thought', the history of human forms of thinking -and thus also of science. According to Neurath, these can only be addressed -not Isolated -as a history of certain tools within the context of the entire history of human thought Depending on the level of development, manifestations of such tools can be magic, but they can also be modem science." With his precise account of the development of human thought as a process of liberation from metaphysics, Neurath certainly made a contribution to 'unified science' (and not just in the trivial sense that his work appeared in the 'library of unified science').
ha his comment on the Vienna Circle quoted above, Kelsen explains that he had always rejected ethics as advocated, for instance, by Schlick. In that context, Kelsen also alluded to the fact that in his second edition of the Relne Rechtslehre** he dealt with one of Schlick's arguments on ethics. 59 With an eye to the moral norm, Schlick asserted that a norm is nothing other than a mere rendition of a fact of reality, in that it only specifies the conditions under which an act an opinion or a character can be actually referred to as good, i.e., be deemed moral, hi his opinion, laying down norms is nothing but a matter of defining the concept of goodness, which ethics seeks to recognize. A judgment the proposition that a form of behaviour corresponds to a norm, is thus a judgment on a fact Kelsen argues against this, claiming that the point of moral evaluation -i.e., the judgment that a certain behaviour is good -is not stating a fact of reality, i.e., of being. This controversy leads back to the question of the possibility of a 'normativlst' legal science.
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To complete this discussion, I would like to briefly mention Felix Kaufmann, the renowned Austrian legal theoretician and philosopher, hi both his life and his work, Kaufmann forms a sort of 'missing link' between the Vienna School of Legal Theory and the Vienna Circle. Kaufmann sought to avoid the idealist consequences deriving from the assumption of a category of'ought', while also recognizing that the notion of the unified sciences would lead the social sciences into a dead-end. He thus attempted to develop an all-embracing theory of science using a 'phenomeuological' approach.
C Kelsen and Psychoanalysis
Kelsen's contacts with Sigmund Freud and his school were manifold. Nevertheless, it is important to make a distinction between the personal relations of these two significant figures and the intellectual inspiration that Kelsen drew from psychoanalysis.
Earlier than Metall remarks, Kelsen participated in Freud's 'Wednesday Meetings'. 62 He became a member of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society on 15 December 1911. On this same day he attended an evening lecture where he spoke with a friend of his, the lawyer and psychoanalyst Harms Sachs, on the 'feeling for nature '. 63 Kelsen attended further meetings, but it does not seem -with one rather insignificant exception -that he made any other statements. 64 He only began to study Freud's thought more intensely in 1921. Towards the end of that year, Kelsen gave a lecture at the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society on 'The Notion of the State and Freud's Mass Psychology', which was later published in Freud's journal Imago.
On a more personal note, Kelsen's psychoanalytical insights were also important in his conflict with Fritz Sander. The latter, a once particularly devoted student of Kelsen, turned away from the Pure Theory of Law and developed a theory of legal experience. 65 This, of course, did not stop Kelsen from giving his support to Sander, who ultimately became a professor at the German university in Prague. At this point, however, Sander accused Kelsen of academic plagiarism. Kelsen responded by immediately setting up a disciplinary Inquiry to investigate the substance of these accusations, which naturally led to Kelsen being completely exonerated. In spite of this severe falling out, Kelsen later agreed, through Franz Weyr's intervention, to resume contacts with Sander during the dark Prague period which they both lived through. Kelsen was able to see in Sander's strange behaviour a 'case of an unresolved Oedipus complex that could be explained by means of psychoanalysis' and to interpret the accusation of plagiarism as an attempt at patricide. 66 In this context, it is interesting to note that in the 1950s Kelsen volunteered his services to the psychoanalyst K. R. Eissler for an extended 'psychoanalytic interview'.
See a recently published book by F. Stadler (ed.), Phinomenologit und Loglscher Empirismus. Zcntenarlum Felix Kaufinann (1997) . See H. Nunberg and E. Fedem (eds), Protokolle der Wiener Psychoanalytischcn Vcrclnlgung. voL III . at XIV. Ibid, at 3 31. In the discussion on this lecture, some aspects that were Important to Kelsen were addressed. Freud enlarged on this The ancients bad an anlmist world view and a bit of aesthetic natural feeling. Sachs had pointed out that aesthetics, the feeling for nature evolved with the decline of anlml<mi Only once the world was deprived of deities did the feeling for nature gradually emerge. I.e.. when libido was withdrawn from objects of the past' ft&voLIV. at 1, 5 (statement by Kelsen), at 26. 95. 104. F. Sander, Stool und Recht Protegomena at dner Theorie der Rcchlserfahnmg (1922) . For a detailed account see M&alL supra note 1, at 39.
The resulting material, which would be of vital interest to the study of Kelsen's life and thought is, unfortunately, not yet publicly available.
The lecture Kelsen gave at the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society took place during the time that he was preparing Der soziologische und der furistische Staatsbegrtff (The Sociological and Juridical Notion of State') (1922). Kelsen addressed one of Freud's arguments, which the latter had borrowed from the French mass psychologist Le Bon. 67 Freud held the view that a 'mass' united for a specific goal and, oriented towards a Fuhrer figure, was connected by the element of 'libido'. Kelsen saw the progressive aspect of Freud's explanation as being that he no longer proceeded from a real phenomenon of the 'mass soul', while still attempting to rationally explain mass cohesion. Of course, Kelsen criticized Freud for seeing the constitutive element of the state as lying in the phenomenon of mass cohesion.
In this point Kelsen may have misunderstood Freud. In his 'Massenpsychologie und Ich-Analyse', the latter had argued as follows: 'In opposition to an otherwise understanding and astute critique of Hans Kelsen, I cannot admit that the human soul's endowment with a given structure implies a reification of the same, i.e., the adjudication of an independence from the psychic processes in an individual.' 68 A further inspiration drawn by Kelsen from Freud was his recourse to social psychological studies for the ideology-critical aspect of the Pure Theory of Law. In his essays 'Der StaatsbegrilTund die Psychoanalyse' ("The Notion of State and Psychoanalysis') and 'Gott und Staat' ('God and State'), 6 ' Kelsen made an extremely bold attempt as a legal theoretician to apply Freud's theory of totemism -collective consumption of the same sacrificed animal by the tribal community as an act of identification -to legal theory. In the idea of the state as person, the 'illustrative personification of the legal order constituting the social community and founding the unity of a diversity of human behaviour 1 , an example of a 'reification' was to be replaced by the recognition of the state as a legal function. Kelsen saw parallels with other concepts of substance -such as 'force' in physics or 'soul' in psychology -and thus considered his thought to be part of an anti-metaphysical movement directed against enlightenment In the 'totem-meal', it was possible to recognize the primal image of any conception of substance. Through an analysis of the common roots of man's religious and social outlooks, Kelsen developed his later highly ramified social-psychological work which culminated in the monograph Vergeltung und Kausalitdt ('Retribution and Causality').
There is yet another aspect of psychoanalysis which influenced Kelsen's thought though In a more implicit manner. The specific 'image of man', upon which Kelsen oriented his concepts of democracy and international peace, was clearly influenced by Sigmund Freud. 7 " Relevant social psychological considerations by Kelsen can be found in particular in his Staatsform und Weltanschauung (Form of State and Weltanschauung) (1933) . 71 Here, Kelsen examines the democratic 'character' and finds it In the type of person who has a relatively reduced sense of ego, the type of sympathizing, peace-loving, non-aggressive Epson, a person whose primary aggressive drive is not so much directed to the outside world but rather Inwardly, manifesting itself as a tendency to self-criticism and a heightened disposition for a sense of guilt and responsibility. In his view, democracy did not form a favourable terrain for the principle of authority.
While explicit references to Freud are lacking here, we do find a reflection on the construction of the ego-ideal in its social dimension. Accordingly, the collective ideal is based on agreeing individual ego-ideals where the Individuals replace their ego-ideal with one and the same object and thus identify on the basis of their ego. Key concepts are thus idealization, on the one hand, and identification, on the other. In a democratic and pacifist rational person, Kelsen obviously saw the ideal of 'equality with the "you"' replacing subjugation under authority. 
